This paper concerns the identification, estimation, and selection of some of the linear econometric models that are widely used in corporate governance. I discuss how exclusion restrictions derived from the characteristics of the governance system may help to identify the models, explore alternative approaches for consistently estimating the parameters of interest when endogenous covariates are present, and use statistical tests and goodness-of-fit measures to eventually select the appropriate model. Results from the Spanish case in the early 1990s illustrate these analyses.
Introduction
Several econometric pitfalls may be encountered when estimating economic relations involved in the governance of large firms, particularly when testing the causes and consequences of the separation of ownership from control Lehn 1985, Short 1994) . Various articles, typically using IV-2SLS estimators and American (cross-section) data, have addressed the endogeneity of corporate ownership and other control mechanisms in the analysis of firm performance. 1 However, tackling endogeneity using the appropriate estimator may not be enough to obtain reliable inferences. First, the choice of instruments and their statistical properties should be carefully analysed (Bound et al. 1995) . Second, little attention is paid to identifying the models even though identification is not always guaranteed (Bhagat and Jefferis 2002 ).
Third, model selection criteria are needed insofar as alternative estimators, instruments and/or specifications are considered (Nakamura et al. 1990 ). This paper discusses how to deal with these questions in the context of a blockholder system of corporate governance and presents supportive illustrative evidence from the Spanish case. 2 The study of a governance system characterised by large, controlling shareholders shifts the research agenda from the classical agency setting of professional managers and widely dispersed owners to the potential conflict of interests between controlling and minority shareholders Röell 1999, Morck 2000) . How this conflict affects the financial and payout policies of the firm (Bianco and Casavola 1999, Gugler and Yurtoglu 2003) and whether tunnelling strategies may cause an expropriation of the minority shareholders (Johnshon et al. 2000) are examples of topics in this area. However, it is also interesting to investigate whether "direct shareholder monitoring by large shareholders improve the governance and hence the profitability of the corporation" (Gugler 2001: 3) and, more generally, the "impact of corporate control mechanisms on firm performance" (Chirinko et al. 2003) . Such investigations reveal that the nature of the econometric analyses in these two agency agency problems-separation and expropriation-is often essentially the same: namely, the estimation of a performance equation in which managerial and concentrated ownership are, respectively, critical explanatory variables (Becht et al. 2002 , Holderness 2003 .
Why focus then on the relation between firm performance and ownership concentration in blockholder systems of corporate governance? One reason is that in such governance systems 1 See e.g. Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) , Himmelberg et al. (1999) , Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) , and Palia the set of active mechanisms of control is a priori different from that of the Anglo-American and bank-based systems. With respect to the former, differences may arise from the absence of certain market mechanisms (e.g. takeovers), and with respect to the latter, from the absence of specific non-market mechanisms (e.g. bank control and the two-tier board). Notice also that some mechanisms, notably boards and remuneration policies, may actually be in the hands of the blockholders and would consequently be acting as a single complex mechanism. These features simplify the econometric specification and help to identify the model. Another reason is that although the American case and the effects of managerial ownership on performance have been much more studied (Denis 2001, Denis and McConnell 2003) , La Porta et al. (1999) and Faccio and Lang (2002) have recently shown that large shareholders predominate all over the world. It is therefore important to analyse econometric strategies that explicitly take into account this major feature of most corporate governance systems.
Other studies that have addressed this issue in some way are Lehman and Weigand (2000) , Chirinko et al. (2003) , and Gugler and Weigand (2003) . Lehman and Weigand (2000) examine the German governed corporation and its comparative performance. They make use of estimation and hypothesis testing procedures also explored in this paper to conclude that, under certain circumstances (exposure to the stock markets, wide time horizons, presence of financial institutions among the shareholders), the governed corporation does perform better. In a related study, Gugler and Weigand (2003) provide evidence that, while in the USA insider ownership is endogenous to firm performance, in Germany it is exogenous. This evidence further suggests that large shareholder ownership is exogenous in both Germany and the USA. As for Chirinko et al. (2003) , they investigate the impact of investors' legal protection and ownership concentration in firm performance. They propose a four-step estimator that, given the time-invariant endogenous variables that measure corporate control, allows them to analyse Dutch governance relations in the long term. Their results indicate that the monitoring effects of equity markets may backfire. Also, little evidence is found for a positive effect of large shareholders on performance.
This paper is partially built on these studies but its main aim is to provide practical guidelines for the applied corporate governance researcher -see also Börsch-Supan and Köke (2002) .
It differs from them in that it takes a broader econometric perspective that goes beyond the estimation stage and in its interest in governance systems with one-tier boards in which the influence of banks is not as pervasive as it is in Germany or the Netherlands. This approach borrows a great deal from Bhagat and Jefferis (2002) , mostly with respect to model identification. In marked contrast with this paper, however, Bhagat and Jefferis (2002) do not address model selection. Also, they focus on managerial ownership and the American case whereas I focus on ownership concentration and the Spanish case as an example of a blockholder system. More specifically, the paper dwells on the determinants of ownership concentration (i.e. the causes of the separation of ownership from control) and the effects of ownership concentration on performance (i.e. the consequences). With slight modifications, however, researchers interested in other institutional settings and related empirical tests may easily apply the proposals contained in this paper. 3 In my view this is its main contribution to the literature: to provide a framework (admittedly, incomplete) for the econometric modelling of corporate governance relations. In particular, the paper addresses three major points.
First, it argues that governance investigations frequently face problems of identification due to the shortness of exogenous variables. Notice for example that in the extreme case of considering all mechanisms of control it would be almost impossible to attain identification.
However, even when studying a single mechanism the identification of the models deserves at least some attention. Following Renneboog (2000) and Franks et al. (2001) , I propose to derive the econometric specifications from the analysis of the control mechanisms that define the system of corporate governance. As I show below, this yields useful exclusion restrictions for trimming the vector of endogenous variables down. In this respect, the distinction between control mechanisms that act at the legal and market level (e.g. codes of best practice and product market competition) and those that act at the firm level (e.g. debt and ownership concentration) is similarly useful. The paper's second point concerns the estimation procedure. I discuss alternative ways to instrument endogenous control mechanisms and, though I obviously cannot set a general rule, by presenting the pros and cons of each method I hope to provide researchers in this area with enough insights to decide which one is more convenient for the problem in hand. To deal with the two sources of endogeneity (unobserved heterogeneity and reverse causality), in single equation models I use either the "within groups" or the first-differencing transformation and OLS and IV estimators, whereas in system of equations models I use Error Components Two-and Three-Stage Least Squares and either time demeaned or first-differenced Two-and Three-Stage Least Squares estimators (Corwell et al. 1992, Baltagi and Chang 2000) . As for the choice of instruments, this paper draws attention to the need for diagnostic tests stressed in recent econometric literature (Staiger and Stock 1997, Zivot et al. 1998) . However, given the complexity of this issue here I shall simply discuss the importance of reporting first-stage statistics and relevance measures (Shea 1997) . 4 In line with its practical aim, the paper finally analyses the question of how to select the appropriate model for making inference. In a literature that is by and large empirically-driven, this is an aspect of the econometric modelling that surprisingly tends to be neglected. Empirical studies in corporate governance routinely present results from different models (samples, estimators) to assess the robustness of their conclusions. However, researchers appear to be less keen to report results from an objective economic and/or statistic selection criterion. A reason for this may be the lack of a solid theoretical framework that provides a benchmark or "true model" (Shleifer and Vishny 1997) , but this, if anything, just makes it more necessary to resort to statistical criteria. Consistent with this argument, this paper exploits orthogonality conditions and overidentifying restrictions embedded in the models to construct Durbin-WuHausman hypotheses tests (Wu 1973 , Hausman 1978 , Nakamura and Nakamura 1981 . These are complemented with a goodness-of-fit measure for IV regressions (Pesaran and Smith 1994) .
The paper is organised in two main sections: Section 2 provides the econometric foundations and Section 3 provides illustrative empirical results. In Section 2 I first summarise the basic features of the empirical tests on the causes and consequences of the separation of ownership from control. I then analyse the identification problems around the endogeneity of some control mechanisms and discuss methods to consistently estimate the two models of interest (causes and consequences). Lastly I describe the procedures for choosing the model. In Section 3 I apply these proposals to the Spanish case in the early 1990's. First I review the available evidence on the mechanisms of control used in the Spanish listed firms. Later I present econometric specifications consistent with this and estimates from an unbalanced panel of utilities and manufacturing listed firms. I complete this section with an evaluation of the models. Section 4 is the conclusion. 4 As Coles et al. (2003) pointed out, "[t]he challenge (...) is to address the endogeneity problem either by specifying and estimating a structural model of the firm or by implementing suitable econometric remedies". This paper follows the second approach, whereas they follow the first. More specifically, they specify a structural (augmented) principal agent model, calibrate it to actual American firm data, and then use it to generate another data set on which they evaluate the results from fixed effects and 2SLS-IV estimators. They conclude that these econometric techniques fail to correct for endogeneity in the relation between managerial ownership and firm performance. Notice, however, that they examine estimators that only control for one of the sources of endogeneity. In general, structural models are not without problems either: multiple and nonexistent equilibria, (over)simplifying assumptions, computational burden, etc. In fact, " [t] here are applications (...) where such models are neither feasible nor desirable" (Himmelberg 2002: 8) .
Modelling the causes and consequences of the separation of ownership from control
In any large joint-stock company there is an inherent conflict of interests between owners and managers around the distribution of the residual control rights. Nevertheless, shareholders are willing to deliver a good deal of their decision-making power to managers. They may think, for example, that managers are more capable of obtaining benefits because they have more expertise. In any case they know that there are mechanisms that, to a large extent, control managers' actions. More precisely, these control mechanisms help to align managers' actions with the interests of shareholders (in general, of all the stakeholders) when transaction costs preclude writing a complete contract between the parties (Hart 1995) . Some of these mechanisms work inside the firm, e.g. boards and remuneration policies, and some work outside, e.g. regulations and takeovers. Each of these mechanisms should help to mitigate the agency problem embodied in the legal structure of the joint-stock company. However, the incompleteness of markets and contracts makes this a question to be empirically tested (Denis 2001) .
Stemming from this general framework, different patterns of ownership and control lead to different agency conflicts (Barca and Becht 2001) . The advantages of dispersed ownership and weak shareholder control are increased share liquidity and the exposure of the company to the disciplining role of the market for corporate control. The downside is that managers enjoy more leeway than in a tightly held firm. It turns out that small shareholders do not monitor managers optimally because of the fear of free-riding: a monitor bears all the costs related to his/her control efforts but enjoys benefits in proportion to his/her shareholding. As a consequence, only a large share stake provides sufficient incentives to monitor the management.
The presence of large shareholders exercising control may reduce the likelihood that managers deviate from the corporate objectives. However, this comes with low liquidity and at the risk of squeezing minority shareholders (Johnson et al. 2000, Gugler and Yurtoglu 2003) . In light of these trade-offs, the question that remains unsolved is whether the power of large shareholders should be limited to avoid expropriation or, conversely, whether concentrated power should be encouraged to curb managerial discretion. Empirical research is therefore needed to assess which policy should be pursued in a particular firm and institutional setting (La Porta et al. 1998 , Morck 2000 .
The models
Indeed, the separation between the ownership of shares and the control over the principal policies of the firm lies behind numerous investigations in corporate finance -see e.g. Becht et al. (2002) for an overview. However, this paper is only concerned with those that study the determinants of the ownership structure, i.e. the causes, and the gross effects of ownership concentration on performance, i.e. the consequences Lehn 1985, Denis and McConnell 2003) . This means that no effort is made to disentangle the monitoring benefits of ownership concentration from its agency, diversification, and liquidity costs (Short 1994 , Gugler 2001 . Similarly, no distinction is made between inside (i.e. management-involved) and outside shareholders because, given that the paper is interested in firms with large controlling shareholders, such a distinction appears to be elusive (Holderness and Sheehan 1988, Denis and Denis 1994) . Lastly, I acknowledge that the vast range of topics addressed under these headings makes it impossible to define a general econometric specification. I therefore restrict my analysis to the simplest form: Model 1 will refer to "the causes" and Model 2 will refer to "the consequences".
Model 1 in reduced form emerges directly from the claim that ownership structure is endogenously determined at the firm level, i.e. it is the outcome of a maximisation process in which shareholders weigh the costs and benefits of the resulting distribution of shares. However, ownership concentration is ultimately a mechanism of control. As such, its variations should be related to the other mechanisms and especially to those that act inside the firm. This would consequently require a System of Equations Model (SEM) or at least a Limited Information System of Equations Model (LISEM, as defined in e.g. Zivot et al. 1998 Zivot et al. : 1121 . However, for the descriptive purposes of this section, it is convenient to keep things simple and leave the details of model specification for subsequent sections. Let OC be a N × T variable measuring ownership concentration, X 1 be a (N × T ) × k matrix containing firm characteristics as well as other mechanisms of control, δ be a conformable parameter vector, and u be an error component with u it = c i + ε it , i = 1, . . . , N and t = 1, . . . , T , where i stands for individuals and t for time periods. 5 Model 1 can then be mathematically written as
As for Model 2, it is argued that if ownership concentration and the other mechanisms 5 Without loss of generality, it is assumed that the individual (ci) and idysioncratic (εit) components of the error are independent random variables with zero mean and constant variances. Further assumptions on the error components in the form of orthogonality conditions with respect to the explanatory variables are discussed in the following sections. It is also assumed that the degree of control (proxied by the concentration of ownership) is the only dimension of the ownership structure that is endogenously determined. Since this assumption is rarely called into question in the literature (see, however, Cubbin and Leech 1983) , I leave for future research the possibility of making the locus of control endogenous.
of control help to solve agency problems, they should consequently impinge on the economic performance of the firm. Of particular interest in this claim is the role of the structure of property rights that stems from the distribution of shares: e.g. the presence of blockholders, the levels of managerial ownership, and the type of large shareholders. As Agrawal and Knoeber (1996: 378) pointed out, however, "since alternative control mechanisms exist, greater use of one mechanism need not be positively related to firm performance". Also, "the direction of causality between ownership structure and performance is not clear: concentrated ownership can improve firm performance via better monitoring, but well-performing firms could also attract investors" (Börsch-Supan and Köke 2002: 297) . These remarks indicate that either a LISEM or a SEM could be specified, but again I will skip the issue for the moment. Let EP be a vector of dimension N × T representing a variable of economic performance, X 2 be a (N × T ) × k 0 matrix with columns made of control mechanisms as well as of other relevant explanatory variables, β be a conformable parameter vector, and v be the error component (v it = c i +ε 0 it ) with analogous properties than u. Model 2 can then be written as
Despite the apparent simplicity of Models (1) and (2) making correct inferences on them requires a careful analysis. " [E] mpirical studies on corporate governance tend to be subject to a host of econometric problems", including sample selectivity, omission of relevant variables, and measurement errors (Börsch-Supan and Köke 2002: 296) . This section, however, focuses on questions related to identification, endogeneity, and model selection. This limitation is imposed for the sake of simplicity and because of the different nature of these problems. Whereas the questions of interest here are mostly related to the econometric modelling, the previous questions have their ultimate origin in the availability and/or quality of the data. However, I
shall briefly discuss the potential effects of these data problems in the context of the illustrative case presented in Section 3. Another limitation of the paper is that it assumes (static) linear relations between dependent and explanatory variables. Although (dynamic) nonlinear approaches are not uncommon (see e.g. Bianco and Casavola 1999 and Renneboog 2000) , this would unnecessarily complicate the analyses without providing further insights.
Identification
Applied researchers in corporate governance may wonder why it is necessary to bother with the identification of Models (1) and (2). After all, this issue is rarely mentioned in the literature (Bhagat and Jefferis 2002) . The cause for concern is that matrices X 1 and X 2 should, strictly speaking, account for all mechanisms of control and thereby Models (1) and (2) should be complemented with additional equations for each of these endogenous mechanisms to be identified -see e.g. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Allen and Gale (2000) for a breakdown. Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) , for example, include equations for the managerial labour market and debt.
However, two major caveats would apply to such a complete system of equations. First, it would require a tremendous effort in data collection. In fact, the model may be impossible to implement because of the well-known difficulties involved in collecting corporate governance data (Becht and Röell 1999) . Second, it is likely to end up with an unidentified structure because of the small number of exogenous variables that remain.
Fortunately, not all the mechanisms focus on disciplining managers in poorly performing companies or always exert a significant disciplinary effect (Frank et al. 2001) . Actually, each mechanism works in an alternative and complementary way with respect to the rest of the set for, although all tend to pursue the same goal, only a few are really operating as a balanced whole. In other words, negative, positive and no interrelationships between the mechanisms are possible (Renneboog 2000) . What defines a system of corporate governance is precisely which mechanisms are at work. American and British stakeholders, for example, see takeovers as a powerful device, whereas in Germany, France, and Spain the market for corporate control is of minor importance and a market for partial corporate control, in which large blocks of shares are traded, operates instead. In contrast, shareholdings are on average higher in Continental
Europe than in the USA and the United Kingdom (Barca and Becht 2001) .
It follows from this evidence that a straight path to identification is to exclude those "inactive" mechanisms from the models. This would reduce the dimensionality of the vector of endogenous variables and may provide additional instruments. The problem with this approach is that it hinges heavily on an accurate evaluation of the set of mechanisms. To illustrate how it works, let us consider a hypothetical application on the determinants of the ownership structure of German corporations. "In the stereotypical view of German finance, hostile tender offers are virtually unheard of, with banks (rather than markets) assumed to play an important role in both the financing and control of German corporations" (Jenkinson and Ljungqvist 2001: 397-398) . Accordingly, variables related to the market for corporate control should be considered exogenous or excluded from the models, whereas those related to the banks' monitoring activity should be considered (weakly) endogenous. However, the empirical evidence provided by these authors challenges this view and suggests that "the building of hostile stakes" represents a level of hostile acquisitions "of a similar magnitude to the incidence of hostile takeovers in the UK".
Moreover, the study raises caveats on the monitoring role of German banks and emphasise their assistance to the predator companies. As a result, our econometric specification, correct under the widespread view of the German system of corporate governance, would be completely misleading.
As the previous example suggests, the distinction between internal and external control mechanisms may provide further exclusion restrictions. On the one hand, internal mechanisms such as boards and debt can be basically seen as a function of the other mechanisms, i.e. of both the other internal mechanisms (e.g. ownership concentration) and the external ones (e.g. codes and regulations). On the other hand, external mechanisms are either institutional or market devices that do not depend on firm-specific decisions. Rather, they are determined by supply and demand factors in the political and economic arena (La Porta et al. 1998 , Manjón-Antolín 2004 . Bearing in mind that in Models (1) and (2) the unit of analysis is the firm, one may argue that no reverse causality exists between the two subsets of mechanisms, i.e. internal and external. In fact, external mechanisms may be potential instruments of the internal ones because of the existence of common underlying factors affecting both subsets. 6
One should also bear in mind that in blockholder systems of corporate governance some internal mechanisms are actually dominated by the blockholders (Holderness 2003) . At the end of the day, the size and composition of the board hinge on the characteristics of the ownership structure and it is within the board's discretion to set management remuneration policies (especially in countries with a one-tier board). It can therefore be argued that ownership concentration causes board structure and, ultimately, managerial compensation, but not the other way round. This means that in Model 1 exclusion restrictions should apply to these variables.
However, it is less clear whether analogous restrictions should apply to Model 2. Although these have traditionally been considered powerful mechanisms of control, recent studies cast doubts on the significance of their effect on performance -see Murphy (1999) for a detailed survey. Moreover, Holderness and Sheehan (1988) and Denis and Denis (1994) show that majority-controlled corporations have smaller boards with fewer outsiders on their seats and that top executives owning the majority of shares are better paid and less likely to be terminated. This evidence indicates that these internal mechanisms (i.e. equations) become redundant when voting power is heavily concentrated. 7 6 The idea reminds us of the informative role of markets in the theoretical literature. When modelling the effects of product market competition on managerial slack, for example, competition is assumed to reduce the cost of providing incentives to managers and reveal which managers are better suited to successfully run the firm (Hart 1995, Allen and Gale 2000) . If, as is assumed, these signals are arguments in the decision functions of the stakeholders, they are not far from the definition of an instrument: they are correlated with the internal mechanisms that act as an explanatory variable in our econometric models, but not with the non-systematic component of the variable of interest (namely, ownership concentration and performance).
7 Franks et al. (2001) , for example, find no evidence of increased board restructuring in the wake of poor Identification problems can be substantially reduced in this vein. As practical advice, our main concern at this stage should be to model the behaviour of the internal active mechanisms (e.g. to discuss which variables apart from the other mechanisms affect them) and avoid omitting relevant external mechanisms. Having identified the model by carefully analysing the characteristics of the governance system, we can now turn to the estimation process. Later we should test the proposed exclusion restrictions to avoid imposing overidentifying conditions on the models.
Estimation in the presence of endogenous mechanisms
Consistent estimation of Models (1) and (2) depends on the stochastic properties of the error component with respect to the explanatory variables. In particular, it must deal with the fact that some control mechanisms on the right hand side of the equations may be endogenous. Biases in the estimates may appear otherwise, thus severely distorting the conclusions of the study.
Aware of this problem, researchers have recently opted to use IV-2SLS estimators instead of the biased OLS of the so-called "first generation of studies" (Becht et al. 2002, Denis and McConnell 2003) . However, to find the most appropriate estimation method it is necessary to clarify the source of the endogeneity problem and determine whether the econometric specification is based on a single equation or a system of equations (and therefore which is the vector of instruments).
In doing so, I will review the estimation strategies proposed in recent related studies and discuss their main characteristics. 8
Unobserved heterogeneity and/or reverse causality
Endogeneity stems from the correlation between the explanatory variables and the error term.
In maths, E (X 1 u) 6 = 0 and E (X 2 v) 6 = 0. Clearly, given that u and v are error components, the inequalities hold whenever the explanatory variables (X 1 , X 2 ) are contemporaneously correlated with the individual-specific component (c i ) and/or with the idiosyncratic component (ε it , ε 0 it ). The first situation is usually referred to as "unobserved heterogeneity" and the latter is usually referred to as "reverse causality" or "simultaneity". However, following Cornwell et al. (1992) it is convenient to use terms based on orthogonality conditions. This means distinguishing between endogenous variables (correlated with c i and either ε it or ε 0 it ), singly exogenous variables corporate performance when large outside shareholders are present in British companies, and Palia (2001) shows that the effect of pay-for-performance sensitivity of American CEOs on firm value is not statistically significant. (correlated with c i but not with ε it or ε 0 it ), and doubly exogenous variables (uncorrelated with c i and either ε it or ε 0 it ). Unobserved heterogeneity would bias our estimates if the explanatory variables were singly exogenous. This is a pervasive issue in corporate governance studies. Firms have characteristics that the researcher cannot observe (know-how, good will, etc.) but that are likely to be correlated with both the right-and left-hand side variables. Cross-section studies such as Demsetz and Lehn (1985) , Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) , and Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) tend to neglect this correlation. As a result, they may have reached misleading conclusions -see, however, Zhou (2001) . Panel data, on the other hand, allow us to obtain consistent estimates with no further external data or assumptions on the individual effect. Time-demeaning (i.e. withingroups) and first-differencing transformations, for example, sweep out the annoying individual effect. Time-demeaning is the approach followed by e.g. Gugler and Weigand (2003) , as well as by Lehman and Weigand (2000) and Himmelberg et al. (1999) insofar as they use an equivalent dummy-variable least squares estimator -see also Palia (2001) . Both transformations (hereafter WG and FD, respectively) provide consistent estimators under the assumption that there is no contemporaneous correlation between explanatory variables and idiosyncratic errors.
However, their efficiency depends on the time series properties of ε it and ε 0 it : the WG estimator is more efficient than the FD estimator if the idiosyncratic errors are serially uncorrelated. In this paper, I present results for both estimators as well as simple tests of serial correlation. I also present "between-groups" estimates (BG) to contrast the WG and FD results with those from inconsistent cross-section estimators. 9 Unobserved heterogeneity is not an issue, however, when all of the explanatory variables are doubly exogenous. Yet analogous endogeneity concerns may arise if some of the explanatory variables are endogenous. As suggested in the description of Models (1) and (2), a simultaneity framework may be needed to model the relation between EP , OC, and the mechanisms of control that are effectively in action. Least squares estimators for single-equation models, even 9 The serial correlation test for the WG estimator is based on the fact that, under standard assumptions, uncorrelated idiosyncratic errors imply negatively correlated WG-errors with correlation equal to −1/T − 1.
Such a result can be tested using an F −statistic on the coefficient of the regression of the WG-errors on their lagged values using a sample of T − 2 periods (the last two, for example). The serial correlation test for the FD estimator is the t−statistic of the regression of the FD-errors on their lagged values. If we conclude that the FD-errors are serially uncorrelated, then the idiosyncratic errors are a random walk and FD is more efficient than WG (Wooldridge 2002) . Care should be taken in interpreting the results of this test, however, given the small time dimension of the panels usually exploited. In our illustrative example T = 5 and in e.g. Lehman and Weigand (2000) T = 6; data availability is better in the USA, but still far from ideal: in e.g. Himmelberg et al. those that control for the other source of endogeneity, would produce inconsistent estimates.
In fact, the existence of unobserved heterogeneity across the cross-sectional units renders 2SLS and 3SLS estimators inefficient. This caveat on the statistical significance of the parameters of interest applies e.g. to the studies of Demsetz and Lehn (1985) , Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) , and Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) . This paper seems to be the first to use Error Components Two-and Three-Stage Least Squares estimators (EC2SLS and EC3SLS, respectively) that do account for the unobserved heterogeneity in an unbalanced panel of firms (Baltagi and Chang 2000) . Interestingly, this specification also accounts for the possible correlation between the error terms of equations (1) and (2) due to e.g. shocks afecting the dependent variables.
Finally, X 1 and X 2 may be composed of singly-exogenous and endogenous variables. There is a tendency in the literature to concentrate on either heterogeneity or simultaneity as the main explanatory factor for the inconclusive evidence found in the ownership-performance relation (Coles et al. 2003) . However, this same evidence suggests that both sources of endogeneity may occur in the model and should therefore be taken into account to obtain consistent estimates.
The empirical strategy should accordingly proceed by first eliminating the individual effect and then using an IV estimator. Himmelberg et al. (1999) , Lehman and Weigand (2000) , and Gugler and Weigand (2003) , for example, seem to have used an analogous procedure to the WG-IV (FD-IV) explored in this paper for specifications based on LISEMs. However, I am not aware of any previous paper in this area that uses an SEM framework in which all the variables are previously subject to either the within-groups or the first-differencing transformation (Corwell et al. 1992) . 10 
Instruments and specifications
The approaches proposed to deal with the endogeneity problem can also be classified according to the instruments and specifications used. Some studies have estimated single-equation models with instruments chosen ad hoc (LISEM), and others have explored systems of equations models and therefore used all of the exogenous variables in the system as instruments (SEM). In our framework the former applies to the case of endogenous and singly exogenous explanatory variables and the latter to the cases of endogenous and either double-or singly-exogenous variables.
Applications using LISEM include Demsetz and Lehn (1985) , Himmelberg et al. (1999) , and Lehman and Weigand (2000) for Model 1, and Lehman and Weigand (2000) and Gugler and Weigand (2003) for Model 2. It is difficult to extract a clear pattern in the choice of instruments from such a small number of studies, but two features are worth noting. First, these studies use a wide array of instruments for the variables of interest. Second, most instruments are based on the same firm data that supplies the other covariates. 11 Both features may raise doubts about the validity of inferences since they affect the consistency and the expected bias of the IV estimators used. However, this issue has received little attention in the corporate governance literature. Following Bound et al. (1995) I advocate reporting the F −stastistic from the first stage regression to assess the finite-sample bias of the WG-and FD-IV estimators.
Although this "pre-testing" procedure does not provide a solid basis for judging the relevance of the instruments, it can still be a useful indicator of potential inconsistencies, especially when, as is likely to happen in governance studies, the instruments are weakly exogenous. It also seems interesting to present results from different sub-sets of instruments to evaluate whether the results are driven by the choice of a particular set. Lastly, to measure the relevance of the instruments I resort to the partial R 2 proposed by Shea (1997) . This is computed as the squared correlation between the residuals of two auxiliary regressions: the endogenous explanatory variable on the remaining exogenous explanatory variables and the projection of the endogeneous explanatory variable on the instruments on the projection of the remaining explanatory variables on the instruments.
Among the studies using SEM, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) examine the relationship between firm performance and a number of mechanisms (insider shareholdings, outside blockholdings, institutional shareholdings, outsider membership on the board, managerial labour market, and debt), whereas Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) leave aside other mechanisms and focus, as I do, on the interdependence between ownership and performance -see also Demsetz and Lehn (1985) . Notice that here the choice of instruments is less of an issue because it is actually made when specifying the model. This point can be addressed with suitable misspecification tests (see below). However, the potential bias caused by the use of cross section data still has 11 Demsetz and Lehn (1985) instrument ownership concentration with firm size, a measure of the instability of a firm's environment or firm-specific risk, and dummies for utilities, financial firms and media companies. Himmelberg et al. (1999) similarly use firm size and idiosyncratic risk (although interpreted in terms of managerial risk aversion) to instrument managerial ownership. As for Lehman and Weigand (2000) , they instrument ownership concentration and ROA (in a Model 1 and Model 2 type of specification, respectively) using firm size, firm growth, number of large shareholders, lagged capital structure, market concentration, capital intensity, and a dummy for the presence of the largest shareholder on the executive board. Finally, Gugler and Weigand (2003) instrument both the largest and insiders' shareholdings with their lagged values, firm size, firm growth, capital intensity, and lagged capital structure. to be resolved. Several estimation procedures, conditional on the orthogonality assumptions imposed on the model, are available. Under the assumption of double exogenous explanatory variables, we can use EC2SLS and EC3SLS (though strictly speaking the former is a single equation method), and estimate the variance-covariance matrix using errors from a previous 2SLS estimation. For unbalanced panels, estimation becomes slightly cumbersome, but it may pay off in terms of the efficiency gains (Baltagi and Chang 2000) . Under the less restrictive assumption of singly exogenous explanatory variables, we can use either the within-groups or the first-differenced SEM estimators described in Cornwell et al. (1992) . These estimators will be denoted by WG-2SLS (FD-2SLS) and WG-3SLS (FD-3SLS). In the empirical application of Section 3 these two options are explored in an SEM based on equations (1) and (2). In maths,
This SEM will be denoted by Model 3. 12
Model selection
Having estimated alternative specifications with different methods and instruments, the question that naturally arises is, which are eventually the most appropriate? Whereas estimation clearly belong to "the realm of Econometrics", economic theory should ideally put forward guidelines for specifications and instruments. Examples of this can be found in Coles et al. (2003) , who derive and calibrate their specification from an augmented principal agent model, and in Manjón-Antolín (2004) , who obtains the comparative statics of a utility maximisation model to determine the sign of the parameters. However, structural applications in corporate governance are in their infancy (Himmelberg 2002) . The usual practice is to propose tests based on previous empirical evidence yet loosely related to an economic model. The presentation of Models (1) and (2) above shows how "[m]ost empirical work (...) has focused on simple hypotheses which are not always grounded in rigorous theoretical analysis" (Becht et al. 2002: 80) . Still, economic theory might have a say when using IV estimators. Without a model of reference, however, the discussion over whether or not a certain variable may be considered a good instrument can easily take us to a dead end. This became apparent in the previous section when we discussed the variety of instruments proposed in the literature. All in all, economic theory offers little help in making these choices, which leaves room for the statistical criteria.
An interesting feature of the estimation procedures advanced in this paper is that they can be evaluated from three complementary perspectives (Nakamura et al. 1990) . As a first exploratory step we can analyse the robustness of the inferences obtained with different sets of instruments. That is, we can compare the conclusions reached from LISEM and SEM (e.g.
WG-IV versus WG-2SLS)
. Similarly, we can compare limited-and full-information estimates of the SEM (e.g. EC2SLS versus EC3SLS). This kind of sensitivity analysis is not a rigorous test but it is useful for detecting misspecification errors.
Second, we can check the orthogonality conditions underlying the classification of the explanatory variables. To this end, the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test is a natural candidate (Wu 1973 , Hausman 1978 , Nakamura and Nakamura 1981 in the former, imposed in the whole system in the latter). This can be therefore seen as a test for overidentifying restrictions in the system of equations specification. However, because EC2SLS uses different sets of instruments for each equation, the test cannot be calculated for the whole error-components system but for each equation.
Third, we can complement model selection procedures based on hypothesis testing with results obtained from loss function criteria. The most popular criterion among applied researchers is undoubtedly the coefficient of determination or R 2 , which in the classical regression framework allows us to select the model that fits the data best. Unfortunately, the R 2 does not maintain its properties in IV regressions like the ones used in this paper. There is, for example, no guarantee that its values will belong to the [0, 1] interval, as indeed happens in Lehman and Weigand (2000) . Instead, a goodness-of-fit measure for IV regressions is required. This paper uses the Generalized R 2 of Pesaran and Smith (1994) . This measure is based on the predicted errors instead of the IV residuals and reduces to the classical R 2 when the instruments span the explanatory variables. Unlike hypothesis testing procedures, loss function criteria are well suited to rank alternative specifications. Moreover, they are not subject to the caveats that may arise from the assumptions adopted to construct the test statistics and the different status attributed to the null and alternative hypotheses. On the other hand, they are less conclusive. La Porta et al. 1999, Faccio and Lang 2002) ; ii) the econometric specifications are due to be relatively simple because in the period of analysis active control mechanisms were practically reduced to ownership concentration and possibly debt. Before going into the details of the econometric analysis, however, it is first necessary to conclude which control mechanisms were effectively acting in the Spanish corporate governance of the early 1990's.
Control mechanisms in Spanish listed firms
To provide a thorough analysis of each mechanism is clearly beyond the scope of this paper.
Fortunately, for our purposes it is enough to discuss their level of activity on the basis of anecdotal and statistical evidence. In particular, I shall consider the following. Among the external mechanisms, takeovers and the market for partial corporate control, competition in the product market, and regulations and codes of best practice. Among the internal mechanisms, executive compensation, boards, the degree and locus of control, and debt.
Takeovers and the market for partial control
It is widely acknowledged among Spanish scholars and practitioners that the market for corporate control as a disciplining device was practically nonexistent in the early 1990's. One need only consider that the CNMV, the Spanish Stock & Exchange Commission, noticed in its 1997
Annual Report that although "fourteen takeover bids were registered" in that year (out of about 300 potential targets), only "half of them were meant to change control in the affected firm".
More elaborated analyses for the 1991-1997 period lead Alcalde and Espitia (2003) to conclude that 69 non-financial listed firms had been the subject of a proper takeover bid, i.e. excluding cases like going private, reductions in capital, etc.. They find no evidence of disciplinary motives behind these bids. According to these authors this is consistent with the friendly nature that characterise most of the takeovers examined.
There is of course the possibility that the disciplining effect operates through a market for partial corporate control. Using a sample of 88 non-financial listed firms Crespí-Cladera and detect 171 block transfers in the 1991 to 1995 period, each involving more than 5% of firm equity. The average purchase is 34.3% for foreign investors and is in general around 20%, both figures suggesting that significant changes occur in the ownership structures of the firms and subsequently in their boards' compositions. However, they find that poor performance is not the main motivation for block transfers. They arguably contend that this market for share blocks is not acting as a substitute for the market of corporate control.
Competition in the product market
There are no official statistics on the degree of market competition faced by Spanish listed firms.
The best statistical source I could come up with is an annual survey of the Spanish Ministry of Industry on the activity and strategies of manufacturing firms (Encuesta sobre Estrategias Empresariales). These data show that for the period 1991 to 1995 the average market share of firms with more than 200 workers was about 30%. Since many of these firms are listed this might indicate that they compete in oligopolistic markets. However, one cannot conclusively infer the existence of market power from high market shares.
To properly estimate the size of firms' mark-ups in the 1990 to 1998 period Fariñas and
Huergo (2003) During the early 1990's, however, the basic regulations in force remained practically unaltered (CNMV 1991 (CNMV to 1995 . It is also interesting to note that these laws followed from a legal harmonisation process with the EU that affected basically the structure of the stock exchanges and the information requirements for listed firms (accounting, ownership structures, etc.). In contrast, their impact on the governance arena was small. This sphere of the firm was implicitly left to the voluntary compliance of self-regulation measures (Wymeersch 1998) . However, in
Spain it was not until 1998 that the so-called "Olivencia Commission" set the first code of best practice. Consequently, I can take the legal framework as given and proceed with the econometric modelling of firms's behaviour within this stable setting.
Executive compensation
As for the internal mechanisms, a contract is perhaps the simplest economic device to align managers' actions with the interests of shareholders. It is well-known that under certain conditions the optimal compensation scheme in an agency setting boils down to a linear function in aggregate measures of firm performance (output, profits, share prices, etc.). This is the prevailing remuneration policy in large firms all over the world, as a recent report from the consultancy 
Boards
An important finding of Ortín-Angel and Salas-Fumas (1998) is that the design of executive compensation contracts in Spain responds to a balance between different incentive systems. If managerial compensation schemes based on performance can be seen as the carrot, the threat of dismissal after, for example, a change in control is definitively the stick (Denis 2001) . In fact, the contractual solution implicitly requires someone to ensure that these incentives work properly and that managers do the job they are paid for. In Spain, as in many other countries, the board of directors is legally responsible for this "duty of care".
However, it is often claimed that boards cannot be an effective monitoring mechanism because they are dominated by managers and CEOs. This concern is reflected in the emphasis placed by the Spanish codes of best practice (the "Olivencia code" and, more recently, the "Aldama code") on the need for separating the role of chairman and CEO, increasing the number of non-executive directors, and introducing auditing, remuneration, and nomination committees. Index of Spencer Stuart. This survey shows that the CEO was the chairman of the board in 68% of the Spanish listed firms analysed. In addition, only one out of five directors could be said to be independent (the vast majority of which were ironically nominated by the CEO and the dominant shareholder). As for the size of boards, the other critical feature of independence, the survey concludes that the typical board had on average 12 members. Despite the heterogeneity of the cases involved, this figure would rank Spain in the group of European countries with the smallest boards, according to the "European Board Index" drawn up in 1999 by the same consultancy firm. 13
These descriptive statistics indicate that boards may not have fulfilled their duty of care, 13 It is worth comparing the statistics from the Stuart Spence survey with those from Gispert (1998) . His data covers the period 1990 to 1995 and comes from the Fomento 2500 publication and the annual reports of companies. According to Gispert the percentage of "insiders" on the boards was on average 24%, but his definition of an insider is more restrictive than the one used by Stuart Spence (on this point see also Gispert and Ortín 2002) . There is much more agreement in the size of boards, which on average was 10.46 members according to Gispert (1998) . However, he claims that this is "not very different from the average size observed in firms of other countries, although relatively large if we take into account (...) the size of the Spanish firms".
but such a conclusion should be taken with care given the proxy nature of the variables. We should bear in mind that boards' monitoring actions are usually non-observable. This has led researchers to focus on the turnover of top managers (particularly the CEO) and to examine whether poor corporate performance triggers management dismissals. This is the approach followed by Gispert (1998) using a Tobit model. His main finding is that total board turnover is positively associated with past poor performance. However, staggered boards are infrequent when ownership concentration is high. Moreover, the turnover of executive directors does not increase as the proportion of non-executive directors increases. These results seem to confirm doubts about the effectiveness of boards as a controlling mechanism.
Degree and locus of control
Large shareholders are in a privileged position for monitoring managers. They have the incentives and the means to do so because they are not affected by free-rider problems and have the capacity to shape the structure and conduct of the board. Unfortunately, the actual level of shareholder influence in board decisions is not publicly available information. Researchers must therefore resort to a proxy variable such as equity ownership, on the grounds of its strong correspondence with voting in AGMs and subsequently with the appointment of directors. In many governance studies this is just a reasonable assumption. In the Spanish case there is supportive empirical evidence: Gispert (1998) and Crespí-Cladera and show that large shareholders tend to intervene directly in the board and replace incumbent managers and directors when firm performance is poor, whereas board and executive turnover is low when takeovers and block transfers to outsiders occur.
This comes as no surprise given the widely accepted view that the ownership structure of the Spanish listed firms is highly concentrated (CNMV 1991 (CNMV to 1995 . In the sample analysed in this paper, for example, the five ultimate largest shareholders hold on average around two thirds of a firm's equity. However, the incentives to correct managerial failure depend not only on the degree of control but also on the location of these control rights (Cubbin and Leech 1983) . Specific types of shareholders may value control differently and may therefore differ in their commitment, capacity, and willingness to intervene. In bank-based systems such as the German and Dutch ones, the role of financial institutions has been a matter of substantial research (Lehman and Weigand 2000, Chirinko et al. 2003) . Some specific features of the Spanish case are therefore worth considering in our econometric specifications: the weight of the (majority controlled) public firms, the occasional controlling role of the banks, and the existence of a substantial group of medium-sized family concerns (Galve and Salas 1996, Leech and Manjón 2002) .
Leverage
Finally, capital gearing may help to discipline managers' behaviour in two basic ways (Shleifer and Vishny 1997) . First, high levels of debt would preclude managers from using free cash flow for projects with negative present value (though this may also hamper good projects). In Spain,
de Miguel and Pindado (2001) provide evidence of a positive relation between free cash flow and debt in firms with small informational asymmetries between shareholders and debtholders.
However, the relation becomes negative for those firms in which such asymmetries are deep.
Second, managers must run the firm efficiently (or at least generate enough cash flow) to avoid defaults on the stream of debt payments and subsequent transfers of control to the creditors.
In Spain, Crespí-Cladera et al. (2002) provide indirect evidence that managers of leveraged firms are more willing to accept remuneration policies based on pay-for-accounting performance schemes (rather than pay-for-share price performance schemes) because high accounting performance enables debt payments to be serviced -see, however, Crespí-Cladera and Gispert (2003) .
In theory, low free cash flow and debt service should lead to better performance, but Galve and Salas (1996) find that in Spain debt actually has a negative effect on the performance of family listed firms. In general, however, their OLS estimates of the debt coefficient are not statistically significant.
Summing up: active mechanisms
All things considered, equity ownership appears to be the pivotal mechanism in the Spanish corporate governance of the early 1990s. Its importance stems directly from the control of boards and indirectly through its influence on executive compensation. Debt and market competition may have also helped to mitigate agency problems, but to a much lesser extent than ownership concentration. Other market and legal mechanisms were barely effective.
Empirical results
Because of its simplicity, the picture that emerges in terms of data requirements is therefore What is typically available are ownership and accounting variables. As Table 1 shows, this is the case for the data set analysed in this paper. 14 [ Table 1 ]
The consequent omission of certain mechanisms in the econometric models may raise concerns about potential biases. However, the evidence for the Spanish case shows that in the 1990s there were but a few active mechanisms and these can be proxied with the information contained in the data set. As for the other mechanisms, their inclusion in the models could only moderately alter the value and significance of the parameters of interest, for they were either nonexistent (e.g. codes of best practice) or of minor importance (e.g. takeovers) or strongly dependent on the mechanisms considered (e.g. boards and remuneration policies). Therefore, reliable inferences can be obtained even with such a limited number of variables. It is also important to stress that, leaving aside data availability constraints, the specification of Models (1) and (2) as well as the extensions to Models 3 and 4, is intended to be very simple. I have tried to link the specifications to the extant literature, but my main aim is to illustrate with some figures the econometric discussions of the previous section. Interesting as this might be, no attempt is made to test other theories or hypotheses beyond the ownership-performance relation. As a result, the proposed specifications may appear somewhat arbitrary. 15
Econometric specifications
Bearing in mind these caveats, in Model 1 the dependent variable is the logistic transformation of the relative percentage of equity held by the largest shareholder (OC ), ln OC = ln(OC/1−OC).
As for the explanatory variables, I have considered firm size (total assets, SIZE ), cross-products of firm size and type of largest shareholder (STATE, BANK, and FAMILY, with non-financial corporations as the residual category), a majority control dummy (MAJ ), the debt to equity ratio (DEBT ), and a measure of the instability of the firm's environment (RISK is the standard financial statements. The initial sample thus includes 226 utilities and manufacturing firms listed on the Spanish stock exchanges for at least three consecutive years over the period 1991 to 1995 (1075 observations). These years almost cover a complete cycle of the Spanish economy: from recession (1990-1993) to recovery (1994-1996) .
More details on this data set can be found in Leech and Manjón (2002) and Manjón-Antolín (2004) . Practically all the Spanish studies cited in this section use analogous sources and data sets.
15 Admittedly, the main caveat that may be cast on the econometric specifications presented below is the omission of variables related to boards and executive compensation in the performance equation. If these were active mechanisms, this omission would mean that the OC coefficient would actually reflect the combined effect of boards, compensation, and ownership concentration. However, this overestimation of the ownership concentration effect would not be a major concern given the illustrative aim of the estimates. In any case, this kind of specification error should become apparent when comparing Two-and Three-Stage estimates. As shown below (see Table 4 ), there are no such signs of misspecification in the models. This is consistent with the evidence presented in the previous subsection and the results obtained in related studies (see footnote 7).
deviation of the firm's daily returns for each year). 16 With obvious differences in the definitions of the explanatory variables, this specification is in the spirit of the seminal paper of Demsetz and Lehn (1985) . Consequently, the equation to be estimated for Model 1 is:
As for Model 2, the dependent variable (EP) is the difference between Return on Assets and the opportunity costs of debt and equity. The costs of debt are aproximated by (Total Assets -Equity)×Interest Rate -Financial Expenditures and the costs of equity by Equity×Interest
Rate. This is a measure of economic performance suggested by Salas (1991) in light of the Spanish accounting practices that somehow accounts for the effects of size and debt. For this reason the explanatory variables of this model only include the degree and locus of control, and proxies for market competition: utilities and manufacturing-sector dummies (SECT ; definitions of the sectors can be found at CNMV 1991 to 1995) and the ratio of net operating result to sales as a measure of gross cash flow (NORS, as in Himmelberg et al. 1999) . Notice, however, that the sectorial dummies are identified only when the "between-groups" transformation and the EC2(3)SLS estimators are used. Also, majority control is not included because previous empirical evidence indicates that it does not significantly affect performance and if it does, it can largely be captured with dummy variables regarding the type of largest shareholder (Holderness and Sheehan 1988, Denis and Denis 1994) . Consequently, the equation to be estimated is:
16 Rafel Crespí kindly provided me with price shares data for the period 1991 to 1995. Data were originally obtained through Databolsa, the firm managing this information in the Barcelona Stock Exchange. However, these data do not fully cover my initial sample of 226 firms and 1075 observations (see footnote 14). Missing values were found in firms that had little trading or had been excluded from the market. With a little help from Alvaro Vergara from www.megabolsa.com, I managed to obtain information on nine more companies, thus ending up with a reduced sample of 137 firms and 637 observations. To analyse the largest sample, I set the missing values of RISK to zero and included as an additional explanatory variable a dummy, DURISK, that takes zero value when RISK is missing -see Himmelberg et al. (1999) for a similar procedure for tackling the potential sample selection bias. Results reported below correspond to this large sample of on average smaller firms with less gross cash flow (see the last column in Table 1 ). However, most of the conclusions remained unaltered when I used the reduced sample and alternative measures of instability such as the difference between BBT of the firm and BBT of the sector in which the firm operates, squared.
Model 3 corresponds to the following SEM that combines equations (4) and (5):
As well as these three basic models on the relationship between ownership and performance, I further explore the role of capital gearing as a disciplining mechanism. This fits nicely with the illustrative purposes of this section. Initially I do this by considering debt as an endogeneous explanatory variable of ownership concentration in (4). Previous studies in Spain by Crespí-Cladera (1998) and Manjón-Antolín (2004) find that debt has no significant effect on ownership concentration in a fixed effects model. However, de Miguel and Pindado (2001) contend that the overinvestment problem underlying the free cash flow theory is largely mitigated by the presence of large shareholders. This would imply that ownership concentration is negatively related to debt. It seems interesting, therefore, to analyse the possibility that the results obtained by
Crespí-Cladera (1998) and Manjón-Antolín (2004) were misled by the endogeneity of debt.
I also use a simultaneous framework relating ownership concentration, performance and debt. "Clearly, if the structure of equity (ownership concentration) and the structure of debt can interrelate to affect firm performance, any analysis of firm performance that focuses solely on equity structure is incomplete", (Short 1994: 242) . This SEM will be denoted by Model 4.
Namely, Model 4 is an augmented version of SEM (6) that includes the following debt equation (w it = c i + ε 00 it ):
This econometric specification partially builds on the investigations of Jensen et al. (1992) and De Jong (2002) . Jensen et al. (1992) study the relation between minority insider ownership, debt and dividend policies in two cross-sections of American firms (1982 and 1987) and De Jong (2002) study the relation between debt and firm value in a sample of non-financial firms listed in the Amsterdam Exchanges between 1992 and 1997. Neither of them, however, control for unobserved heterogeneity since, respectively, they use 3SLS and 2SLS estimators. It appears that this paper is the first to analyse ownership concentration, performance and debt in a blockholder system of corporate governance controlling for both sources of endogeneity.
Estimates
Results from the estimation of Models 1 to 4 under the assumptions on the explanatory variables discussed in the previous section are reported in Tables 2 to 5, and measures of goodness-of-fit (GR 2 ) for each model are reported in the last rows of the tables.
These are discussed later as part of the evaluation of the models.
In the LISEMs corresponding to Models 1 and 2, I report serial correlation tests on the WG and FD errors. I also report statistics addressing the validity and relevance of the instruments in WG-IV and FD-IV estimations. The instruments are selected on the basis of previous studies in Spain -see e.g. Galve and Salas (1996) , Crespí-Cladera (1998), Manjón-Antolín (2004) , and references therein. Nevertheless, I would like to stress that this does not necessarily imply an optimal vector of instruments. In Model 1, I instrument debt with size, a measure of the instability of firm's environment, and cross-products of size and sectorial dummies. In Model 2 I instrument ownership concentration with firm size, cross-products of firm size and type of largest shareholder, instability of firm's environment, and a majority control dummy. In Tables 2 and 3 these estimates are reported in columns WG-IV(1) and FD-IV(1). I also use an expanded set of instruments that includes the main proxy for market competition (NORS ).
These estimates can be found in columns WG-IV(2) and FD-IV(2). As explained above, all instruments are first differences (FD-IV) or deviations from the individual means (WG-IV) of the original variables. Table 2 presents results for Model 1. First I report the BG estimates for the sake of comparison, though the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test indicates that these estimates are severely biased.
Within-groups and first-differencing transformations, on the other hand, provide consistent estimates. Given that the FD errors do not seem to be serially correlated, the standard errors of the FD estimates should be smaller than the WG estimates. However, I cannot reject the null hypothesis that the WG errors are negatively correlated either, i.e. the WG estimator should be more efficient than the FD estimator. This inconsistency is probably due to the short time dimension of the panel. In any case, both estimates outline a similar picture in which only the majority control dummy appears to be statistically significant. Also, consistent with previous empirical evidence from Spanish studies (Crespí-Cladera 1998, Manjón-Antolín 2004), capital gearing does not seem to affect ownership concentration. There are, however, slight differences between the FD and WG coefficients. This indicates that some of the explanatory variables may be correlated with the idiosyncratic errors. If this is so, both FD and WG are inconsistent estimators of the parameters of interest. Instrumenting DEBT, however, does not provide further insights: IV estimates are pretty similar to those obtained from the simple WG and FD transformations. This cast doubts on the endogeneity of this variable.
[ Table 2 ] Table 3 presents results for Model 2. Here too there seems to be substantial unobserved heterogeneity, so it is worth focusing straight away on the WG and FD estimates. In contrast with Model 1, I found evidence of negative serial correlation in the FD-errors and the null hypothesis of negatively serially correlated WG-errors is rejected. Efficiency considerations may lead us to prefer the WG estimates (maybe using robust standard errors). However, since the tests are not totally conclusive I would rather take an eclectic approach to interpreting results. In any case, the dummies for the types of largest shareholders tend to be statistically significant no matter what estimator is used. This is also the case for the proxy of market competition, which concurs with the results obtained by Himmelberg et al. (1999) . The significance of ownership concentration is less clear, although in a scenario of highly concentrated ownership one can expect that differences arise more clearly out of the locus of control than out of the degree of control. The overall conclusion is that, in line with the evidence from other institutional settings with analogous characteristics, ownership is critical in enhancing firm performance. 17 This conclusion holds after instrumenting ownership concentration. However, the small differences between WG and FD estimates indicate that the potential correlation between the variable and the idiosyncratic errors is probably small. This would concur with the results obtained by Lehman and Weigand (2000) and Gugler and Weigand (2003) .
[ Table 3 ]
Estimates from the two SEM considered, Models 3 and 4, are reported in Tables 4 and   5 .
WG(FD)-2SLS and WG(FD)-3SLS estimators are simple extensions of the WG(FD)-IV
estimators to the SEM case and do not merit further explanations. However, EC2SLS and EC3SLS estimators are derived under the assumption that the error components of equations
(1) and (2) are not independent, i.e. E (u it v it ) 6 = 0 (Baltagi and Chang 2000) . To evaluate 17 Interestingly, the BG estimates would lead to the opposite conclusion. This means that if these BG estimates are capturing long-term effects (Chirinko et al. 2003 ), they will support the "equilibrium hypothesis" proposed by e.g. Himmelberg (1999) and Palia (2001) .
to what extent such an assumption holds in our data, Tables 4 and 5 components. This suggests that there is an efficiency loss in the more complex specification. Table 4 shows the estimates of Model 3. The first two columns correspond to the error components estimation under the assumption that all of the explanatory variables are doubly exogenous. The next columns show the results from WG-and FD-IV estimators that allow for the presence of singly exogenous and endogenous variables in X 1 and X 2 . The small differences between the two sets of estimates cast further doubts on the endogeneity of the explanatory variables. Also, results do not differ substantially from those of Tables 2 and 3 except for one fact: the statistical significance of the EP coefficient. This means that ownership concentration tends to improve firm performance and, at the same time, poorly performing firms tend to have a highly concentrated ownership structure. There is therefore evidence of reverse causality between the degree of control and the economic performance of Spanish listed firms.
[ Table 4 ]
Lastly, results from Model 4 are reported in Table 5 . In this model I can address the possibility that the lack of solid empirical evidence around the role of debt as a control mechanism is due to a reverse causality between alternative mechanisms (Short 1994) . In contrast with the conclusion reached by De Jong (2002: 33) that "[g]overnance mechanisms hardly induce leverage" in Dutch firms, I found evidence of a positive effect of ownership concentration on the debt-to-equity ratio. Therefore, the estimates of Models 3 and 4 do not support the claim made by de Miguel and Pindado (2001) in the sense that ownership concentration is negatively related to debt. It is also interesting to note that the reverse causality between ownership concentration and performance found in Model 3 is not robust to changes in model specification.
I can only interpret these results as an indicator that further research is needed to disentangle the complex relationship between debt, ownership concentration and performance.
[ Table 5 ]
In summary, estimates from Models 1 to 4 show that equity ownership was the cornerstone of the Spanish system of corporate governance in the early 1990s. Also, capital gearing and market competition acted as complementary control mechanisms in Spanish listed firms. However, one may argue that these estimates are affected by sample selectivity problems, omission of relevant variables, and measurement errors. Large listed firms, for example, may perform better than small non-listed firms, thus causing a sample selection bias -see, however, Lehman and Weigand (2000) . However, many of these small non-listed firms do not face the conflicts of interests (managers vs. shareholders, controlling vs. minority shareholders) that shape corporate governance (Morck 2000) . Also, sample selection is an issue as long as we are interested in the whole population of firms, but it is much less so if we restrict attention to a subset of this population. Inferences are still valid conditional on the particular sample of listed firms.
Another source of selection bias may be missing data. If some observations are randomly missed in the data set, as seems to happen in the one used in this paper, the introduction of a missing-observations dummy in the model may suffice (though it may not be the most efficient procedure). However, if there is an underlying selection mechanism (if, for example, poorly performing firms and/or firms with concentrated ownership structures are more likely to have no trade in the stock market), then one should correct for it. 19 As for the impact of omitted variables, it has been argued that this can be considerably reduced by deriving the econometric specifications from the analyses of the set of mechanisms and then focusing only on those that are effectively acting. The lack of available data on a number of mechanisms precluded testing this argument directly, so the specifications are eventually based on indirect evidence. To the extent that this evidence is correct, however, results should not be substantially affected by this caveat. Finally, descriptive statistics reported in Table 1 indicate that some variables may contain measurement errors. Notice, for example, the extreme values of SIZE and DEBT. Errors-in-variables are not uncommon when using raw accounting data and can be seen as another source of endogeneity in our models. "Naturally, things get harder when measurement error is combined with models with only sequentially explanatory variables. Nevertheless, differencing away the unobserved effect and then selecting instruments (...) generally works in models [with] such a variety of problems" (Wooldridge 2002: 314) . All in all, these should be taken as limitations of this study that are difficult to correct given the sources of data I used.
Model Evaluation
These caveats aside, notice that most conclusions remain unaltered when different sets of instruments are used. In general, results from the system-of-equations specifications tend to agree with those from single-equations specifications. In Models 1 and 2, this statistic is used first to assess the assumption that the explanatory variables are singly exogenous, i.e. to test the null hypothesis that E (X 1 c i ) = 0 and (X 2 c i ) = 0 (Hausman and Taylor 1981) . As expected, the (weighted) difference between WG and BG estimates is statistically significant in all cases. This test is also used to assess the presence of endogenous covariates but now using an equivalent F −distributed form (Wu 1973) . 20 In Model 1, it tests for the null hypothesis that E (DEBT ε) = 0 and in Model 2 that E (LOCε 0 ) = 0. The However, when the instruments are weak these tests tend to be conservative in the sense that they do not reject the null hypothesis too often (Staiger and Stock 1997) . It is therefore important to address the question of the validity of the proposed instruments. To do this,
in Tables 2 and 3 I either the WG(FD)-IV or the WG(FD) can be used (Nakamura and Nakamura 1981) . Results reported in Tables   2 and 3 were obtained using the WG(FD)-IV estimated variance.
(see footnote 12), may well apply to other governance studies. Further evidence is therefore needed from other research settings (countries, models) to asses the relevance and validity of the proposed instruments.
In this respect it is also worth testing for overidentifying restrictions on the excluded instruments when, as with these specifications, the number of instruments exceeds the number of endogenous variables. The test statistic is calculated as (N × T ) × R 2 , where R 2 is the coefficient of determination from a regression of the residuals from the IV estimation on all of the exogenous variables and instruments of each model. Results reported in the penultimate row
of Tables 2 and 3 show that the statistics are all within acceptable bounds in Model 2 but not in Model 1. On the one hand, when the instruments are weak this test is not χ 2 −distributed and this may have distorted the results obtained for Model 1 (Staiger and Stock 1997) . On the other hand, weakly exogenous instruments such as those proposed in Model 1 produce much greater inconsistency in the IV estimates when their relevance is low (Shea 1997) . All things considered, IV estimates of Model 1 should be totally disregarded and those of Model 2 should at least be interpreted with care.
Similarly, I test for overidentifying restrictions in the SEM. The χ 2 −statistic is computed now as in Hausman (1978 Hausman ( : 1264 Hausman ( -1266 ) and can be interpreted as a "check on the internal consistency of the (...) specification". The results show no signs of misspecification in Models 3 and 4. I should accordingly prefer full-information estimators because of the efficiency gains compared to the limited information procedures. However, the small differences observed between two-and three-stage estimates may ultimately be due to the small cross-equation covariances (reported below the error components estimators). If the matrix of variances and covariances is actually block diagonal, there is no real trade-off between robustness and efficiency (Corwell et al. 1992) . As a result, the choice of one or other estimator would not make a big difference.
What does make a difference, however, is the potential error of specification due to the omission of endogenous explanatory variables. This means that two-and three-stage procedures on the SEM specifications (or, alternatively, a two-stage estimator for the LISEM version of the model)
would provide good estimates of the coefficients of interest, δ and β.
However, this conclusion is based on the results from hypotheses testing and these are also subject to a number of caveats: e.g. non-rejection of the null does not exclude the possibility of a Type II error and a significant test statistic does not imply that we have to "accept" the alternative. To complete our empirical analysis, it is therefore interesting to have a look at the goodness-of-fit measures in the bottom rows of Tables 2 to 5 . Unfortunately, they are not very conclusive. In Models 3 and 4, for example, they support time-demeaned transformations in the LOC equation and first differencing transformations in the EP equation. However, in Models 1 and 2 they tend to support WG(IV) rather than FD(IV) estimators. One may use this result to discriminate between them whenever the efficiency criterion cannot be properly tested because of the short number of time periods available, as in this paper. The small GR 2 of the debt equation in Model 4 can also be used as an argument for choosing a more parsimonious specification. Also, system specifications appear to fit the data better than single equation models. Taking into account results from both statistical testing and goodness-of-fit measures, I would rather confidently conclude that the two-and three-stage estimates of Model 3 that control for unobserved heterogeneity are the most appropriate framework for making inference from this data.
Conclusions
This paper presents empirical strategies for dealing with some of the problems involved in the econometric modelling of corporate governance relations. In particular, it discusses conditions for identifying the models and selecting instruments, puts forward consistent estimators for The proposals in this paper cannot solve all the econometric problems that characterise corporate governance investigations (for example, those related to the data are not covered), but they will hopefully provide useful guidelines for researchers. It is also apparent that they can easily be extended to other systems of corporate governance and to related empirical studies in corporate finance. As a major caveat, care must be taken in deriving exclusion restrictions to avoid biases from the omission of relevant variables. However, as the results for the Spanish case show, concerns may also arise about measurement errors, poor instruments, and so on. To a large extent these concerns reflect the main shortcomings of this literature: lack of quantitative theory and the need of more and better data. 21 The latter one has no simple solution (and any 21 Himmelberg (2002) , emphasis original.
solutions there may be are probably not in the hands of scholars), so it is tempting to leave aside empirical approaches such as those discussed in this paper and fully embrace the use of structural models. In my view, this attitude would be misleading. We should pursue both avenues of research and be aware of their benefits and limitations. 
